All Black losses not a deal breaker

Let’s not worry unduly about a couple of All Blacks losses.

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Anyone who doubted there’s a malign force in the universe determined to squeeze every last drop of optimism out of the New Zealand public and keep us in a state of high anxiety must surely now be convinced. Less than a month ago it was all going so swimmingly: the All Blacks were ticking those boxes their coaches always talk about, injured players were coming right, and selecting the World Cup squad was a matter of culling the embarrassment of riches.

In the space of a week those cosy assumptions and the reassurance they provided vanished into the ether. The loss to the Springboks suggested the gap between our first-choice players and their back-ups is significant, alarmingly so in some cases. The loss to the Wallabies suggested there’s no gap between our first-choice players and theirs. There were worrying injuries, breathtakingly capricious decisions by match officials reviving the spectre of sudden-death games being decided on a whim, and a swirl of rumours that the soap operatic romance between New Zealand rugby and Sonny Bill Williams is about to end in tears.

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The first casualty of this turnaround is the general consensus that coach Graham Henry and his lieutenants know what they’re doing. Given that every back-of-the-envelope amateur selection would have featured at least 80% of the names that were actually announced, the months of debate boiled down to four decisions: who would back up Richie McCaw and Dan Carter and who would be cut to resolve the seven-into-five-won’t-go outside back conundrum.

It’s arguable – and many are arguing – that they got three of the four calls wrong. In Port Elizabeth, Adam Thomson and Colin Slade had the opportunity to ­demonstrate that, even when the heat is on and the opposition formidable, we can get by without McCaw and Carter. They didn’t and we couldn’t. In Brisbane, Zac Guildford had the opportunity to demonstrate his energy and alertness justified his selection ahead of the less industrious but more threatening Hosea Gear and Sitiveni Sivivatu. He didn’t. On top of a similarly messy display at the same ground in the Super 15 final, his performance suggested he’s not yet mentally ready for the big time.

But the die is cast; now it comes down to injuries. If the All Blacks have a good run in that regard, these contentious choices will hardly be sighted beyond pool play. Henry could point out many of the critics are now writing off the very players they promoted and, Sivivatu’s track record at test level aside, there’s no real basis for their implicit assumption that the alternatives would have done a lot better.

How much should we read into these two defeats? Not very much at all. In the Henry era, which began in 2004, the All Blacks have played the Springboks in South Africa 10 times for six losses and four wins, so it was to be expected that an under-strength side would come up short against their top team. In the same period the All Blacks have won eight of their 10 home games against the Boks.

In that time the All Blacks have lost four of their 10 away games against the Wallabies. Of their six wins, two were by four points and two by a single point. In other words, it’s not easy over there. Over here, on the other hand, they’ve beaten the Wallabies 10 times out of 10. Margins are instructive, the key indicators being six and under and 15 and over.

A margin of six and under means the game was “live” right to the end in the sense that one score – a converted try – by the losing team could have changed the outcome. Conversely, a 15-plus margin means the losing team was three scores behind, so the game was effectively over well before the final whistle. Since 2004 the All Blacks’ average winning margin in home tests against the Springboks is 16 points; against the Wallabies it’s 15.